Jusletter

Inhaltsverzeichnis

• 1. Introduction
• 2. Foundations
• 2.1. Three layers of creditor protection problems within the European Union
• 2.2. The approach to designing a system for efficient creditor protection
• 2.3. The principle of non-liability of corporate decision-makers towards corporate creditors
• 2.4. Possible reasons for protecting corporate creditors
• 2.5. Approach and organization of the paper
• 3. Types of corporate creditors
• 4. Types of corporate creditor risks
• 4.1. Voluntary corporate creditors
• 4.1.1. Time
• 4.1.2. Cause
• 4.1.3. Originator
• 4.2. Involuntary corporate creditors
• 4.3. Particularities of corporate creditors' risks
• 5. The extent of corporate creditor protection
• 5.1. Efficient corporate creditor protection and its limits
• 5.2. Initially inappropriate contractual terms and conditions
• 5.3. Ex post devaluation of a claim
• 5.3.1. Strong-form opportunism
• 5.3.2. Weak-form opportunism
• 5.3.3. Business misfortune
• 6. Mandatory protection rules v. creditor self-help
• 7. Strategies for mandatory creditor protection
• 8. Reducing the risks of creditors when contracting with a financially distressed company
• 8.1. Mandatory disclosure unrelated to insolvency
• 8.2. Insolvency-related mandatory disclosure
• 8.2.1. German v. British law
• 8.2.2. Timing
• 9. Reducing a company's probability of entering into financial distress
• 9.1. Legal capital
• 9.1.1. Minimum capital
• 9.1.1.1. Initial minimum capital requirement
• 9.1.1.2. Ongoing minimum capital requirement
• 9.1.2. Limitations on asset distributions to shareholders
• 9.1.2.1. General observations
• 9.1.2.2. The bottom-line test
• 9.1.2.3. Providing for stricter limitations?
• 9.2. «Sufficient» working capital (undercapitalization)
• 9.3. Subordination of shareholder claims
• 9.3.1. The German subordination regime
• 9.3.2. The economic rationale
• 9.3.2.1. Restrictions on repayments of shareholders loans
• 9.3.2.2. Subordination as such
• 9.4. Controlling other forms of opportunistic behavior
• 9.5. Disqualification of directors
• 10. Reducing the risks of existing creditors from a company's being financially distressed
• 11. Civil liability of directors and shareholders
• 11.1. General observations
• 11.2. Direct liability towards creditors
• 11.2.1. Direct liability as an exceptional solution
• 11.2.2. Determining the directly liable person
• 11.2.3. Consequences of unlawful distributions in particular
• 12. The resulting framework