Jusletter

Table of contents

• Introduction
• I. The role of the patent in the antitrust analysis
• A. The presumption of patent validity
• B. Potential competition in Lundbeck
• II. Restriction of competition by object
• A. Legitimate patent settlements including a reverse payment
• B. Rejecting the scope of the patent test
• C. Exclusion reverse payment settlements as restrictions by object
• 1. The size & the disproportionate nature of the reverse payments
• 2. Exchanging uncertainty for certainty through a value transfer
• 3. Proposed justifications for the value transfers in the settlements
• 3.1. Risk asymmetry
• 3.2. Irreparable harm from generic entry
• 3.3. The avoidance of litigation costs
• 4. Reverse payments and the Cartes Bancaires decision
• 5. No exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU
• III. A harsher standard than FTC v. Actavis?
• A. Will the Lundbeck decision dissuade settlements?
• B. Comparing the tests in Lunbeck and FTC v. Actavis
• Conclusions